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Doctrines and Problems Relating to
U.S. Control of Transnational
Corporate Concentration
DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, STUART E.
BENSON, & LISA CHILES
The Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Prac-
tices for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) has recently published a report on corporate concentration among
OECD member states.' The OECD report, which was four years in prepara-
tion, has drawn on data supplied by nine member states. Among its conclu-
sions are the following:
1. Substantially more increases than decreases in concentration occurred
in Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and in the indus-
tries analyzed by the EEC;
2. In the United States, over the period 1958 to 1972, concentration tended
to remain stable in already highly concentrated industries but increased
in the low to medium concentrated industries in a sample of 183 compa-
rable manufacturing industries... ;
3. The relationship between industry concentration and growth confirmed
the theoretical prediction that at high rates of growth, concentration
decreased, but that at low to medium growth rates, concentration tended
to increase;
4. In general, the evidence of most studies is that high [arguably monopoly]
profits are associated with concentrated industries;
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5. Imports did not restrain the ability of larger firms to raise their margins
relative to the smaller firms unless there was a very high degree of
import penetration; 2 and
6. One United States study found that a two firm concentration ratio of
35 percent or more correlated significantly with high price/cost mar-
gins. Structure itself "as measured by different concentration ratios
explain more than about one-fifth of the variance in industry price/
cost margins."
3
Given this evidence it is not surprising that "high or rapidly growing
levels of concentration are increasingly becoming a matter of concern in
many countries, 4 including the United States. However, a subject of intense
controversy within the United States has been with what should U.S. anti-
trust authorities be concerned, how concerned should they be, and how
reliable are the data on which concerns are based. The greatest controversy
surrounds the question of whether aggregate industrial concentration in
modem societies is increasing rapidly and dangerously. According to David
G. Gill of Exxon Corporation, a member of the Business and Industry Advi-
sory Committee to the OECD which monitors official OECD activities, no
inference should be drawn from the OECD report that aggregate concentra-
tion is becoming a problem.
5
While it is generally conceded that the problem of aggregate concentra-
tion is controversial among antitrust experts,6 as well as the general public, it
is perhaps less well appreciated whether (and to what extent) there is a
problem in the United States of intraindustry concentration (concentration
among the manufacturers of the same goods) and if it is itself controversial.
The conclusions of the OECD report are at variance with those of other
analysts.7
It is the principal thesis of this article that important recent case deci-
sions in U.S. antitrust law reflect just this conflict over the extent to which
intraindustry (horizontal) concentration is economically harmful. We are at a
point where the future direction of the law is difficult to discern. Until there
is greater U.S. policy agreement, and consistency within U.S. law itself, it is
unlikely that any common transnational response will emerge to even hori-
zontal corporate concentration. Ironically, it may not be possible to clarify
U.S. antitrust law as long as the underlying policy conflict remains so sharp.
For the present, there is an impasse in the United States regarding the
question of corporate concentration.
The initial section of this article focuses on some existing legal impasses
in the United States with respect to concentration (1) by mergers between
manufacturers of the same product, especially where the failing company's
defense and considerations of potential competition are involved, (2) by tech-
nology licensing between noncompeting firms manufacturing comparable
products, and (3) by traditional and shared monopolies.
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Four topics, deserving attention in a more comprehensive analysis, will
not be discussed. The first of these is conglomerate mergers. Conglomerate
mergers have generally been permitted under U.S. antitrust law. Since they
promote aggregate concentration, they are subject to criticism by those who
see aggregate concentration as a danger. As already indicated, there is
enough controversy over the problem of horizontal concentration to leave this
even more divisive topic to others.
8
The second topic is vertical mergers. While conceptually distinct and the
subject of a large literature in its own right,9 a vertical merger may frequently
be analyzed in the same manner as a horizontal merger between a potential
competitor and an existing firm in an industry. In vertical merger cases,
customer or supplier enterprises are often the most likely actual or perceived
potential entrants into a particular product market.
The third excluded topic is transnational corporate concentration by pri-
vate international cartel.'0
The fourth topic is the role of governments in promoting corporate con-
centration through the implementation of anticompetitive laws and policies.
It is sufficient to point out that governments often undo with one hand what
they undertake with the other. As antitrust authorities from several nations
are considering how concentration might be lessened to promote competi-
tion, others in these same governments are devising programs to increase
concentration and stabilize markets, sometimes in the service of the same
ultimate objective of greater productivity and allocative efficiency.
Next, the article touches more briefly on a few of the special problems of
applying United States law to foreign firms operating within the United
States and to U.S. transnational enterprises operating in foreign countries.
United States antitrust enforcement policy seeks evenhanded application of
U.S. law to foreign as well as domestic enterprises." However, this is not
always possible because of special problems raised by (1) the so-called extra-
territorial assertion of U.S. jurisdiction where doing so conflicts with impor-
tant laws and policies of other nations, (2) the difficulties in obtaining rele-
vant information from foreign jurisdictions, (3) the difficulties of obtaining
effective relief from excessive concentration outside one's sovereign territory,
and (4) the erosion of the "potential competition" doctrine in recent decisions
by the United States Supreme Court.' 2 These problems combine to give
foreign enterprises certain advantages over domestic enterprises in avoiding
U.S. antitrust regulation.
The Conclusion shows that given the current impasse in U.S. antitrust
enforcement against horizontal concentration, especially where it involves
conduct beyond our shores, there are no imminent prospects for defining
transnational enforcement standards or establishing transnational enforce-
ment institutions. Nonetheless, some modest transnational collaboration is
possible and desirable to clarify policy choices and build a foundation for
future progress.
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THE CONCENTRATION PART OF THE PROBLEM OF
TRANSNATIONAL CONCENTRATION
The identification of a concentration problem is founded on the assumption
that if one or a few firms acquire the power to control prices as to distinct
products in a geographically-defined market, competition will be suppressed,
product quality will decline (as will the range of consumer choice and pro-
ducer productivity, including the development of new technology), and
prices will reflect some degree of monopoly profits. On the other hand, other
considerations may tend to vitiate the characterization of industrial concen-
tration as a problem. For example, large-scale markets and production expe-
rience may increase rather than decrease efficiency; industrial competition in
a high-growth phase may consolidate the industry into a few strong competi-
tors with the weakest firms having to drop out; in the international setting,
domestic concentration may be necessary and therefore desirable in order to
maintain an internationally competitive position. There is as yet no strong
consensus on either the characterization of concentration as a problem, or on
what approaches to the problem so defined are most effective.
Nonetheless, U.S. antitrust law takes a certain cognizance of industrial
concentration as a problematic phenomenon. The prototypical illustration of
this phenomenon in the antitruster's demonology is that of the U.S. steel
industry over the course of this century. Antitrust authorities sometimes view
the relative concentration and lack of competition in the steel industry as a
primary cause of its present state of technological retardation and resultant
difficulty in competing with imported steel. 13
Statutory Overview
Three principal antitrust statutes are directly relevant to the effort to deal with
this problem of concentration, but Section 7 of the Clayton Act is probably the
most powerful tool in the antitrust regulatory regime.14 Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act 15 and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act 16 require
evidence of conspiracies in restraint of trade or unfair trade practices respec-
tively, in order to obtain remedial prohibitions. Similarly, Section 2 of the
Sherman Act 17 requires a showing of affirmative action to obtain or restrain
market power by exclusionary or predatory conduct.'8
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, however, only requires evidence that a
corporation engaged in commerce in the United States is seeking to acquire
another and, by so doing, may substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly. Moreover, when applied prior to the consummation of an
acquisition, Section 7 permits quick, clean, and effective relief to avert anti-
competitive effects by prohibiting the merger. One of the many vexing prob-
lems subsumed by the general issue of concentration is that of formulating an
appropriate remedial order for anticompetitive mergers that have already been
consummated between firms of signficant size in a concentrated market.'
9
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Mergers Between Producers of the Same Product
Although Section 7 seems to be, in theory, the most effective of the present
antitrust statutes, its enforcement by the Justice Department appears to be
declining. According to an unpublished study by the Antitrust Division
there were twenty-three Section 7 prosecutions filed by the Department of
Justice in 1969, sixteen in 1973, and only eleven in 1979.20 The meaning of
this decline is unclear. At least as to horizontal mergers between actual
competitors, the decline may be a reflection of the only locus of consensus
on horizontal concentration doctrine-the general validity of the 1968
Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice (Merger Guidelines). 2 The
Merger Guidelines, twelve years ago, announced that they are to be read
"only as a statement of current Department policy, subject to change at any
time without prior notice"22 and, of course, are not binding on courts.
Nonetheless, not only the Antitrust Division and Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), but also the courts and private antitrust practitioners have been
heavily influenced by the relative clarity and precision of the guidelines.
Illustrative of this precision is the instruction given in the guidelines for
analyzing a possible merger by one of the four largest firms making a product
as to which they share 75 percent of a geographic market. According to the
guidelines, if the acquiring firm possesses a 4 percent market share, the
Department of Justice will ordinarily challenge the acquisition of a competi-
tor with another 4 percent market share.2 If the acquiring firm's share is 15
percent, then an acquisition of a firm with only a 1 percent market share is
likely to be challenged.24
Since September 5, 1978, when the premerger regulations went into
effect, companies with substantial sales into, or assets within, the United
States must give prior notice to federal antitrust enforcement agencies when
planning to merge.2 Of the approximately sixty proposed transnational
mergers referred to the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust Division,
during the first eighteen months of this new notification requirement, only
one involved firms with proportionate market shares close to the standards
set forth in the guidelines. In fact, only three raised any substantial antitrust
question at all and none of these appeared, based on traditional enforcement
considerations, to warrant prosecution.
26
It appears that this consensus in merger law was formed largely because
of the conclusion by the private antitrust bar and its clients that the stan-
dards are reasonable and reduce uncertainty in business planning.
Professor William James Adams has identified two distinct modes of
analysis for reviewing mergers. He calls one "competition as a quasi-goal of
society." The other is "competition for the sake of efficiency." According to
the former, competition is always desirable. According to the latter, competi-
tion is only desirable when it yields net benefits.2 This distinction strikes to
the heart of the current debate over horizontal concentration. If antitrust
lawyers, their clients, and judges conclude that some horizontal mergers
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involving a big firm in a concentrated market are economically beneficial
("competition for the sake of efficiency") the present consensus on the valid-
ity of the guidelines may dissolve. In fact, there already is evidence that the
consensus is eroding in two special horizontal merger situations.
Acquisition of the "Failing Company"
The first involves the acquisition of an allegedly failing company. Where the
firm to be acquired is likely to withdraw from the market by ceasing opera-
tions, it is no more anticompetitive, in many instances, to let another firm
buy it out than to let it go under. The Merger Guidelines state that the
department will accept the defense only where the firm to be acquired has
(1) "depleted resources," (2) only "remote prospects for rehabilitation," and
(3) made "good faith efforts... to elicit a reasonable offer of acquisition more
consistent with the purposes of Section 7.28
How badly off must the acquired firm be? How hard must it try to find a
more eligible suitor? In General Dynamics,29 the Supreme Court may have
suggested that it will entertain arguments about the lack of competitive harm
from a merger which violates the Merger Guidelines, especially where the
acquired firm is competitively weak, with depleted resources, even if not
failing. In that case the acquired company owned substantial coal reserves
that were committed under long-term requirements contracts. Because the
reserves of the acquired firm were spoken for, the Court concluded that the
acquisition was not anticompetitive.
In a recent decision, United States v. International Harvester Co.,30 the
Seventh Circuit read General Dynamics to permit a merger of two companies
with more than 20 percent sales in the concentrated market for high-
powered farm tractors. Apparently, the court felt that while the acquired
company, Steiger, was not failing, it was competitively weak for lack of ade-
quate access to funds for investment. Since Harvester, the purchaser of 40
percent stock interest in Steiger, had a deep pocket, the court reasoned that
the acquisition would serve Steiger's needs.
31
Department of Justice officials have criticized this decision and its sug-
gestion that the failing company defense is now reduced to a "weakened
competitor" defense.32 They correctly point out that the Supreme Court in
General Dynamics did not conclude that the contractual commitment of its
coal reserves made the acquired firm a weak competitor. It only concluded
that the committed reserves were not a factor in the market and that the
relevant product market was properly narrowed to reserve coal mining capac-
ity for future sales.33 There is now a direct conflict between two circuit courts
and the issue remains for future resolution.
Acquisition by a Potential Competitor
The second horizontal situation in which there appears to be erosion of the
Merger Guidelines involves acquisitions by potential future (but not present)
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competitors. According to the guidelines, the threat of entry, either through
internal (de novo) expansion or toehold acquisition of a small firm already
present, "may often be the most significant competitive limitation on the exer-
cise of market power by leading firms, as well as the most likely source of
additional actual competition. '34 In two important decisions, one domestic-
the Marine Bancorporation case,35 the other international-the British Oxy-
gen case, 36 some doubt has been cast on the vitality of that proposition.
In Marine Bancorporation, the Supreme Court established two tests for
a successful challenge to an acquisition of one firm by another based on the
acquirer being an actual potential entrant by de novo or toehold entry. First,
there must be proof that the entrant could feasibly enter the market by other
routes. Second, and more demanding, there must be proof that entry by
another route would have a "substantial likelihood of ultimately producing
deconcentration of that market or other significant procompetitive effects."
37
Implicitly, by setting this condition, the Supreme Court adopted what Adams
has called the "competition for the sake of efficiency" mode of concentration
analysis. However, the Department of Justice in the Merger Guidelines usu-
ally employs the "competition as a quasi goal of society" standard. 38 Competi-
tion is thought to be facilitated when unjustified concentration is frustrated.
It is not necessary, appropriate, or even perhaps possible to demonstrate that
the acquirer will clearly establish a significant independent presence in the
market if its acquisition plans are blocked. The Supreme Court's test puts the
law enforcer in the perverse position of having to know better than the
acquirer itself what its true prospects are for entry by means other than
acquisition. It would make more sense to put the burden of proof on the
acquirer to justify why independent entry is not feasible. Either way, this
decision makes a departure from the clear structural guidelines of excessive
horizontal concentration-a major purpose and benefit of the guidelines.
At present, the law of potential competition-especially as to transna-
tional mergers-is at an impasse. In British Oxygen, the world's second
largest producer of industrial gases-with no prior sales in the United
States-acquired the third largest producer, Airco (a U.S. company), that
occupied 16 percent of a product market in which the top three firms held 60
percent of the market.39 In upholding the acquisition, the Second Circuit
found that the Federal Trade Commission did not show that British Oxygen
was a potential entrant in the reasonably near future. The court held that a
showing of "eventual" entry was not sufficient.4 ° While not discussed in the
opinion, it is worth noting that both the British government and the Euro-
pean Commission filed papers with the court supportive of the merger, ar-
guing that foreign potential entrants are handicapped by cultural and social
barriers that make independent entry even more difficult for them than for
domestic potential entrants.4' This decision would lead one to expect easy
access to American markets by major foreign firms acquiring large American
firms.
However, a recent decision by the Federal Trade Commission indicates
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that the issue has not been finally settled. In the Matter of Brunswick
Corporation,42 involved a joint venture to manufacture less expensive out-
board motors. One of the partners was Brunswick. Its Mercury Division had
approximately 20 percent of the market 3 which made it the second largest of
four domestic manufacturers jointly occupying 95 percent of the market.4
The other partner was the Japanese firm Yamaha. Yamaha manufactured
and sold outboard motors everywhere in the world but the United States-
the largest market.4 5 Yamaha was already established as a successful seller of
motorcycles and snowmobiles throughout the United States, but had failed
twice before to penetrate the outboard motor market de novo.16 The FTC
found (on relatively compressed analysis) that by 1973 Yamaha had the
technology to compete effectively in the United States.
47
Late in 1972, the two firms had formed a joint venture, Sanshin, to
make outboard motors in Japan. These were to be marketed in Japan under a
Yamaha label and in the United States under a Mariner label. The joint
venture was for a period of ten years with automatic three-year renewals
(unless revoked with three years' notice).4 8 The FTC decision found that the
three burdens of proof imposed by the decisions in Marine Bancorporation
and British Oxygen had been met. First, Yamaha's technical capability and
market experience demonstrated the feasibility of its entry.49 De novo entry
was found to be possible through (1) its national network of motorcycle and
snowmobile dealers, (2) private label mass merchandisers, or (3) camping
and sports supply stores.
50
Second, the likelihood of significant procompetitive effects was found in
Yamaha's overall financial strength, development of an advanced motor, suc-
cessful expansion history worldwide, and intention to compete effectively at
the time the joint venture was entered.51
Finally, the FTC took the fact of the joint venture itself as proof that
Yamaha was an imminent potential entrant.
5 2
There is a second potential competition theory besides that of actual
potential entry. It is the theory of the perceived potential entrant "waiting in
the wings" as a threat of competition, keeping present competitors from
giving in to the temptation of oligopoly or collusive pricing. 53 This theory for
control of concentration is even more tenuous, as it depends upon percep-
tions that are subjective and therefore likely to be ambiguous if enough
people are canvased. Nevertheless, the FTC explicitly held that Yamaha
alone among noncompeting enterprises was able "to inspire the fear of com-
petition in the hearts of U.S. manufacturers" before it entered the joint
venture.
54
The case is now on remand to the Administrative Law Judge for a relief
determination, since the Commission had reversed the initial decision on
liability. The difficulty reconciling Brunswick with British Oxygen suggests
that the potential competition doctrine will stand or fall on the weight given
to particular facts of particular adjudications. By applying the three conserva-
tive tests of liability and finding it as to a nonpermanent joint venture (even
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where Yamaha had twice previously failed to effect de novo entry) the FTC
has boldly attempted to reestablish the vitality of the position taken in the
Merger Guidelines-that is, competition as a quasigoal of society.
Whether or not the potential competition doctrine is applied in U.S. law,
can have a profound impact upon the U.S. domestic economy as well as the
transnational economy. If foreign enterprises that are only potential competi-
tors are virtually free to make horizontal domestic acquisitions, the trend
toward foreign takeovers in U.S. markets is stimulated at a time when U.S.
companies appear to be substantially undervalued. It also suggests the possi-
bility that international concentration by merger may reach problem propor-
tions before concentration reaches the trigger point in any national market.
Consider a hypothetical case of a Canadian acquirer not competing in the
U.S. market which acquires a U.S. target not selling in Canada. The Cana-
dian firm is the fifth largest in Canada, and the U.S. firm is fifth largest in
America. There would be no increase in the five-firm concentration ratio in
either Canada or the United States, but there may be a significant increase in
concentration in the aggregate North American market.
Concentration by Technology License
The preceding discussion of the Brunswick case demonstrates that many of
the effects of a merger, including anticompetitive concentration, can be
achieved by joint venture.5 The same is true of technology licensing by one
firm to another, or reciprocally, where the effects of the arrangement may be
not only the reduction of competition inter se but the reduction of significant
consumer choice in the product market generally.
In this area of the law there is something of an impasse as to what types
of technology-sharing arrangements between large firms in concentrated
markets should be and are illegal. Three current and contradictory theories of
excessively anticompetitive concentration are discernible.
The first, and most dubious, is reflected in the most recent decision to
consider the issue. In United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,56 Judge
Weigel held that a fifty-year-old reciprocal know-how agreement between
two billion-dollar worldwide enterprises (Westinghouse and Mitsubishi), as
to virtually their full line of hundreds of electrical products, was not illegal
even though the two enterprises generally did not compete in each other's
home market and the agreement had so provided. His decision was based
on two considerations: (1) it is necessary to prove anticompetitive intent to
render such an agreement illegal, regardless of the anticompetitive effect,
57
and (2) no such intent is shown here because the most plausible explana-
tion for the failure of Mitsubishi to sell in the United States in competition
with Westinghouse is fear of infringing on Westinghouse patents. 58
The first consideration, as the Department of Justice has argued on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit,59 flatly contradicts the Supreme Court decision
in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, which held
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that the legality of agreements must be tested against their effect on competi-
tion. 60 Judge Weigel's second finding is undercut by the fact that the case
was decided immediately after the government presented its case, before the
defendants had intoduced specific evidence showing that there were West-
inghouse patents actually blocking Mitsubishi sales. There is no precedent
for imposing on the plaintiff the burden of proving the negative-in this case,
that patents must have blocked licensee entry into the U.S. market.
61
An alternative theory of liability is argued by the United States on
appeal.
A major manufacturer in a highly concentrated market may not repeat-
edly renew broad, multiproduct, multipatent license agreements that
have the effect of disabling major potential competitors from providing
badly needed additional competition in the United States.
62
In its brief, the United States offers evidence demonstrating that Mitsubishi,
but for the long-term, multiproduct license, was an actual potential entrant
into the U.S. market. It argues that:
The court need not determine how long competitors may renew patent
license agreements before the antitrust laws are violated. There is no
single answer to that question. Rather, under a rule of reason analysis,
the answer in each case will depend on the economic factors relevant
to the parties and markets involved. The issue in this case is, however,
whether the restraints imposed for over fifty years can now be justified
as reasonable in light of the relevant present day economic realities.
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The caution of this statement suggests that reciprocal licensing agree-
ments between large finns in concentrated markets that may have a restric-
tive effect may still be legal if their duration is somewhat less than fifty years
or covering a somewhat smaller range of products than several hundred.
Recent experience of the senior author in Department of Justice decision
making in the technology licensing area demonstrates that this has been the
recent enforcement philosophy of the department. The department has not
filed a single suit following up on its theory in the Westinghouse case. Such a
view encourages long-term restrictive technology-sharing agreements be-
tween the largest transnational enterprises, even in oligopolistic industries.
While such licensing does promote some efficient dissemination of technol-
ogy, one wonders whether the disincentives to independent research in con-
centrated industries, stemming from dependence on a licenser effectively
eliminated from the competitive market for perhaps two or three decades, do
not outweigh the benefits of collaboration.
The Department of Justice appeared to take a more aggressive position
in its Antitrust Guide for International Operations, now more than three
years old.64 The essential problem in this area of antitrust enforcement is
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determining whether a licensee could become a competitor of the licenser
without the benefit of the license. Recognizing this problem as others have,
6 5
the guide suggests that it may be relevant to ask whether the restraint on
competition exceeds "the time it would take [for the licensee] to develop
equivalent know-how itself (the reverse engineering period)." 6 Unfortu-
nately, this "reverse engineering" test begs the question. There is no objec-
tive or precise measure of the reverse engineering capability of a licensee.
Perhaps the most effective approach for exercising greater control over ex-
cessive concentration by technology licensing would be to shift the burden of
proof to the licensing parties where the territorial restraint exceeds a period
of, say, fifteen years, and the parties are large, well-financed, technologically
sophisticated, and operating in noncompetitive industries with significant
barriers to entry.
6 7
Confusion as to which of these three antitrust enforcement approaches
to restrictive technology licensing (or yet another) will be used in the future
reflects the conflict between Adams's two modes of competition analysis.
68
Those who believe that seeking competition for itself increases the economic
efficiency of a society will probably favor a policy to limit restrictive technol-
ogy licensing between large potentially competitive enterprises. On the other
hand, those who believe that many technological problems are too difficult
and too costly for efficient competitive solutions, will tend to favor a less
aggressive policy. Again, there is something of an impasse.
Traditional and Shared Monopolies
The word control in describing existing concentration in the United States is
a misnomer. Dealing with concentration per se as a restraint of trade or a
monopoly is difficult under the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act. When monopolies do violate statutes, however, traditional U.S.
antitrust theory is not content with mere restraint of the monopoly power.
The earliest antitrust cases made it clear that the primary purpose of Sher-
man Act Section 2 is to break up, dissolve, or dissipate monopoly power. In
the 1911 Standard Oil case, the Supreme Court recognized that remedial
relief must not only prevent the conduct that created and maintained a
monopoly, but eliminate the monopoly and restore or recreate competition in
the affected market.69 The National Commission for the Review of the Anti-
trust Laws and Procedures (Commission), recently supported this view.7"
In its January 1979 report the Commission urged the use of structural
relief in Section 7 and Section 2 cases. 71 The Commission's report relied on
two major factors to support this view. First, the commissioners agreed that
structural relief is more effective in restoring competition to an affected mar-
ket. If the only relief is an injunction prohibiting certain conduct, the con-
centrated market will remain; subsequent abuses will be likely, since the
basic market conditions persist, and no court could possess the foresight to
enjoin all possible forms of abuse that a monopolist may contrive. Second,
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use of structural relief avoids the need for continuing judicial or administra-
tive supervision of a monopolist to determine whether it is abusing its posi-
tion or engaging in various practices designed to enhance its position in the
market.
72
One question that was not addressed by the Commission is whether the
need to maintain international competitiveness should be a defense to an
order of dissolution. For example, under Japan's comparable antitrust statute,
the Japanese Fair Trade Commission may not order divestiture when it may
make it "difficult for the firm to maintain international competitiveness."
7 3
This issue has not yet been raised in a U.S. antitrust case.
74
The Commission emphasized that persistent monopoly power, except in
extraordinary circumstances, can be maintained only by culpable conduct.75
This accords with the view expressed in Alcoa 76 and United Shoe,7 7 among
others, that monopoly power itself creates a presumption of culpable conduct
which can only be rebutted by evidence of superior skill and foresight. As a
result, a number of the commissioners believed that the requirement that
conduct to enhance or maintain power should be eliminated by legislation, so
that evidence of persistent monopoly power would lead to dissolution unless
significant economies of scale were shown.7 8 Others believed it was impor-
tant to retain the conduct element. 79 Nevertheless, the commissioners agreed
that persistent monopoly can only be maintained by culpable conduct."0
Some recent cases indicate that the trend is just the other way; that is,
U.S. courts may be more willing to tolerate monopolies and are raising the
burden of proof accordingly for those attacking such power. The courts ap-
pear most tolerant of monopoly power when design changes or product inno-
vations are involved. California Computer Products (CalComp) recently sued
IBM for appropriating its market share in peripheral equipment that Cal-
Comp manufactures to fit into IBM's central processing units.8 IBM manu-
factures both the central units and the peripheral equipment itself. CalComp
was in the business through the process of reverse engineering, whereby it
would buy a product from IBM, break it down and copy it, and then undersell
IBM since IBM's research and design costs were avoided. IBM made design
changes that effectively prevented CalComp from competing on the periph-
eral units for new machines. Some of the design changes, such as integra-
tion of the add-on functions into the main unit, meant not only a lag time,
but that CalComp could not compete at all.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected CalComp's argument that
these technological manipulations violated the antitrust law. 2 CalComp
argued that the changes did not improve performance, but the court found
both cost savings to the consumer and improved performance in the new
units.
83
The recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision overturning most of
the district court's award in Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak,8 4 presents a
similar case. In 1972, Kodak introduced the 110 photographic system, in-
cluding a camera and new film format to go with it. Those companies, in-
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cluding Berkey, that manufactured cameras using film provided by Kodak,
could not immediately compete with Kodak's new camera, and Berkey
claimed that Kodak had unlawfully monopolized the market. The 110 system
had been an immediate success, and Kodak's market share for amateur cam-
eras did not fall below 50 percent for four years.
Berkey presented evidence that the new film product was actually infe-
rior (at least initially) to existing products. The court avoided making any
determination of the value of the new product, deciding that this was a
matter of individual taste. The important question for the court was whether
some coercion was involved.8 5 Was the desire to use the new format moti-
vated by desire to impede competition? The court found no evidence that
Kodak attempted to persuade customers to purchase the 110 camera because
it was the only camera that could take the new film.86 The court concluded
there was no coercive behavior and no violation of the antitrust laws.
In neither of these cases did the court seek to assess the value of the
new product. Both courts indicated that the antitrust laws are aimed at
unreasonable business behavior such as predatory pricing or coercive prac-
tices. In CalComp, the court concluded that price cuts by IBM were not
predatory since they were profitable to IBM and were responsive to competi-
tion from the peripherals manufacturers such as CalComp.
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The Commission report also urged the courts to take a tougher stand in
"attempt to monopolize" cases, under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
Commission was primarily concerned about the approach taken in United
States v. Empire Gas,88 where the conduct was particularly anticompetitive,
but was not actionable since the defendant's market share was not large
enough to present a "dangerous probability of success" of monopolization of
the market.8 9
The Commission concluded that a legislative change to clarify the "dan-
gerous probability" requirement may be necessary,9" because the Supreme
Court has declined to reconcile various circuit court decisions that have
construed the "dangerous probability" requirement differently. 9' The Com-
mission's proposed legislation would require courts, in determining the exis-
tence of a dangerous "risk" of monopoly, to weigh several factors including
the defendant's intent, its present or probable market power, and the anti-
competitive potential of the conduct involved.92 Moreover, under the pro-
posal, the evidence by defendants that prices were not below average variable
or marginal cost would not be an absolute defense, but just another factor to
be considered.93
Successful prosecution of an "attempt to monopolize" case is most diffi-
cult because of the burden of proving a "dangerous probability of success."
Inasmuch as courts evince greater tolerance of monopoly power, they may
also increase the existing burden of proof for attempt cases. These concerns
are evident in the FTC action against Dupont,94 in which it is alleged that
Dupont was employing illegal strategies to expand its production of titanium
dioxide to meet or capture all growth in the market. These strategies in-
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cluded pricing low enough to prevent other companies from expanding pro-
duction and refusing to license its technology, which permitted DuPont to
preserve its technological advantage over competitors.9 5 The administrative
law judge agreed that DuPont would probably acquire a monopoly share, but
refused to hold any of DuPont's actions to be unfair or unreasonable. The
opinion concluded that even if DuPont knew it would gain a monopoly share,
such knowledge was not enough to turn legitimate business conduct into an
illegal practice or to presume an intent to lessen competition or create a
monopoly.
96
Another current problem in U.S. antitrust law concerns shared monopo-
lies. Justice Department officials 97 acknowledge that antitrust theorists differ
on the nature and extent of the problem, and whether it is structural98 or
behavioral; 99 some theorists warn that enforcement agencies should distin-
guish between contrived and natural oligopolistic pricing;10 still others argue
that there is no problem at all.' The concern of the Antitrust Division is that
a few dominant firms in a market, aware of their oligopolistic interdepen-
dence, may also be able to coordinate their decision making so as to achieve a
monopolylike level of performance without an overt agreement.
The Antitrust Division has had underway for more than two years a
systematic examination of concentrated industries in the United States.
0 2
Several concerns have motivated the division to undertake this study. First,
concentration improves the firms' ability to coordinate behavior leading to
anticompetitive results. In order to circumvent the rigors of competition,
these firms must be able to reach some consensus as to the right noncom-
petitive price structure. In addition, they must be able to detect rivals who
might otherwise succeed in gaining increased profits by undercutting the
consensus price.
10 3
Concentration alone may not be enough to enable the firms to coordinate
their activities. These firms may have to adopt facilitating mechanisms,
which the Antitrust Division has defined as any practice (often developed
over time and perhaps even serving a legitimate business purpose) which
facilitates interdependent or cooperative behavior.' 4 Facilitating mechanisms
will vary within each industry. An illustration of the type of activity that may
be classified as a facilitating mechanism can be found in the Westinghouse-
GE consent decree entered with the United States in 1976.105 Westinghouse
and GE made available to each other current price and other competitive
information through price books containing simplified procedures for pricing
turbogenerators, along with a multiplier that could be used to determine the
price each would use in any given sales situation. Both also introduced price
protection policies designed to ensure treatment to all customers, but also
published outstanding orders and price quotations. As a result, both compa-
nies had a means to coordinate prices and avoid accidental or intentional
price undercutting.
Shared monopolies appear to be a matter of considerable concern outside
the United States as well. The Treaty of Rome establishing the European
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Economic Community contains a provision addressed to abuses of a domi-
nant position by one or more enterprises. 0 6 A bill is pending before the
Canadian Parliament that would authorize civil review of joint monopoliza-
tion, defined as any situation where a small number of firms account for
more than 50 percent of a relevant market and pursue closely parallel
policies.' °7 Japan recently enacted a law that presumes an industry to be
monopolized when the market share of one company exceeds 50 percent or
the combined share of two companies exceeds 75 percent. 08 In 1978, the
Japanese Fair Trade Commission announced that twenty-six lines of manu-
facturing industries were considered in a state of monopoly or shared
monopoly.' 9 At present, there is very little practical experience with these
laws, but interest in shared monopoly among various antitrust agencies ap-
pears to be increasing.
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United States antitrust agencies are acquiring more extensive informa-
tion about concentration through the recently enacted premerger notification
requirement of the Clayton Act."' These notification requirements extend to
certain foreign transactions, including those involving major foreign sellers
doing business in the United States or those with significant assets located
here."t 2 The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (the Act) does not cover all acquisitions or
mergers that should be reviewed by antitrust authorities. Rather the Act
purposely limited the reporting requirements to the activities most likely to
raise antitrust concerns. Thus, obtaining information about trends in concen-
tration as such, both here and abroad, will only be assisted partially by this
mandatory requirement. 3
THE TRANSNATIONAL PART OF THE PROBLEM
If little agreement exists on the definition of the concentration problem, there
is even less on what assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction are considered
appropriate to limit transnational concentration. That, in essence, is the
transnational part of the problem. The Justice Department's active enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws in U.S. foreign commerce has met some resis-
tance, especially from foreign governments. The most recent causes celbres
involved the so-called international uranium cartel and the North Atlantic
shipping case. 114 A corollary of the jurisdictional problem is that the difficul-
ties of enforcing U.S. antitrust law over foreign enterprises, especially when
they do not operate in the United States, sometimes gives such enterprises a
type of antitrust immunity that domestic enterprises do not enjoy." 5 Largely
in response to the uranium and shipping cases, the British government has
recently adopted legislation that increases the powers of the British Secretary
of State to prevent compliance with foreign (read United States) demands for
evidence or other orders that offend British jurisdiction or sovereignty, limits
enforcement in Great Britain of foreign antitrust and multiple damage judg-
ments, and (perhaps of most interest) enables British persons and companies
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to recover damages paid under foreign judgments in excess of actual dam-
ages to the foreign plaintiff."
6
The problem, of course, is not new. Laws blocking foreign access to
evidence have been on the books in Great Britain and elsewhere for some
time," 7 and the Australian government recently prohibited the enforcement
of foreign antitrust judgments that offend its jurisdiction and sovereignty. 11
8
Two suggestions seem in order. First, as State Department Legal Adviser
John Stevenson noted in 1970,
In the overwhelming majority of cases, where problems [of jurisdiction]
have arisen they have not been the result of invalid exercises of juris-
diction but rather of two valid, conflicting exercises of jurisdiction." 
9
Antitrust cases have generally not been brought either by enforcement
agencies or private parties unless there was a substantial U.S. connection.
Second, the objection of foreign countries is often not to the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. law per se, but rather to its unilateral application.
Where international agreement exists, even the United Kingdom applies its
law extraterritorially.120 The contracting parties of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permit the application of each others' antidumping
and countervailing duty laws to conduct abroad and generally permit the
gathering of evidence by other countries in their territories in order to en-
force these laws. 121
Unfortunately, the differences among nations (even our major trading
partners) regarding antitrust enforcement have made similar agreements in
the antitrust field impossible. The recently concluded 1979 OECD Council
Recommendation on Cooperation in Restrictive Business Practices Affecting
International Trade calls for member states to cooperate with foreign investi-
gations where national laws and national interests permit.'22 Even this con-
structive step forward necessitates a sometimes painful case-by-case ap-
proach that is not always successful in resolving conflict.
The shipping and uranium cases illustrate these points. In the former,
heavy fines were assessed against a number of U.S. and foreign firms and
individuals for fixing rates and otherwise restraining competition among
them in the North Atlantic shipping trade. Since the case involved shipments
to and from U.S. ports there was little question that the U.S. government had
jurisdiction in a legal sense; U.S. antitrust authorities have the power, and
we believe the right, to set and enforce rules for the conduct of those who
wish to do business in the United States. However, the United States was not
the only country with both a direct interest in the activity and legitimate
jurisdiction to regulate it. Foreign governments argued, as they have persis-
tently done in the past, that the United States should not unilaterally regu-
late this inherently international industry.
In the case of the so-called uranium cartel, certain foreign governments
in 1972 sponsored the establishment of an international arrangement for the
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setting of floor prices for uranium exported by their domestic producers. This
was in response to an embargo imposed by the United States against all
importation of uranium for U.S. domestic consumption, which eliminated
well over half the world's uranium market for foreign producers. There was
some evidence that the cartel had an indirect effect on uranium prices in the
U.S. domestic market, and that members of the cartel attempted to prevent
U.S. middleman uranium dealers from selling uranium abroad. The Depart-
ment of Justice conducted an extensive grand jury investigation into the
activities of the cartel and brought a criminal prosecution against the Gulf Oil
Corporation." It did not, however, sue the foreign members of the cartel.
In both of these cases, foreign governments resisted all attempts by the
grand juries to obtain evidence in their countries. Nonetheless, substantial
evidence was obtained from documents located within the United States and
in the case of the uranium cartel, from inspection of documents obtained
from Australia by the environmental organization Friends of the Earth.
The Justice Department's decision in the uranium case not to take crimi-
nal action against the foreign defendants, over which it believed it had juris-
diction, was taken primarily because of considerations of comity' 24 that
weighed against the application of U.S. antitrust law to foreign participants
in the cartel. 125 Among the factors leading to this conclusion were: (1) the
impact of the uranium cartel on United States commerce was not found to be
substantial, (2) the cartel was formed pursuant to clear and important poli-
cies of the involved foreign states, and (3) these policies sought the reason-
able objective of preserving foreign uranium industries from the otherwise
devastating blow of the protectionist U.S. uranium import embargo. How-
ever, a different standard was applied to Gulf because its first obligation as a
U.S. corporation was to comply with the law of the United States and it could
be expected to be aware of and to act in conformity with that law.
Transnational mergers and joint ventures can raise similar problems. On
the whole, U.S. law enforcement in this area has been quite circumspect.
This is due in part to considerations of comity and to the fact that Section 7
of the Clayton Act applies only to mergers between firms that are actually
engaged in U.S. commerce. 26 However, several additional factors are in-
volved when one or both parties to a merger are foreign companies. First,
differences in language and custom, and uncertainties connected with for-
eign trade and investment, constitute additional barriers to entry into the
U.S. market; foreign companies are thus less likely to be considered potential
competitors. This may have been a factor in the British Oxygen decision' 27 as
well as in a recent FTC decision not to oppose the acquisition by J. I. Case
Company, (a subsidiary of Tenneco) of the French firm Poclain. Case pro-
posed to acquire a 40 percent interest in Poclain assuring control of its U.S.
assets (including a U.S. subsidiary). The Poclain group of companies is Eu-
rope's largest manufacturer of heavy construction equipment. However, the
firm was in some financial difficulty.12 Both Case and Poclain produced
hydraulic excavators and cranes, though Poclain had not produced or sold
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these products in the United States. The French government had approved
the acquisition, presumably to increase the economic vitality of an important
French manufacturing entity.
Considerations of comity, the importance of the merger to the French
economy, as well as the improbability that a foreign company in financial
difficulty would enter the U.S. market, may have led to the FTC's decision to
permit the merger.
In another instance, the Justice Department objected to a proposed in-
ternational joint venture, despite the significant adverse impact its decision
had on the interests of two foreign governments. Pratt & Whitney of Canada
and Rolls Royce of Britain proposed a joint venture whose purpose was to
produce an executive jet engine largely for sale in the United States. 129 Pratt
& Whitney of Canada was a wholly owned subsidiary of United Technolo-
gies, a U.S. firm. The Justice Department found that United Technologies
and Rolls Royce were the two largest manufacturers of jet engines in the
non-Communist world, and the world market was very concentrated. The
Justice Department reasoned that these two companies could each produce
the engines and that the joint venture would preclude potential competition
between them. It rejected the argument that the venture was so costly that
independent development was unlikely. It also rejected the argument that
there already were several viable competitors in the market who would re-
main unaffected by the joint venture. While this was true, the combination of
the Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney names was likely to overwhelm the less
well-known competitors.
This decision led to abandonment of the venture, thereby frustrating a
significant investment in Canada that would have been welcomed by the
Canadian government. One could argue that the United States should have
ignored this joint venture, since Pratt & Whitney Canada was not a U.S.
company. But it was wholly owned and controlled by United Technologies;
there was every reason to treat them as one entity. This economic unit
notion, though objected to by many foreign governments, is not exclusively
American.' 3 ' Furthermore, the original joint venture proposal brought to the
department involved a Pratt & Whitney plant in the United States. It appears
that the Canadian plant was suggested as a new location for manufacturing
after the U.S. situs joint venture was rejected. It should be pointed out that
while the Justice Department opposed this joint venture it approved a more
speculative and costly collaboration between Rolls Royce and United Tech-
nologies to produce a different size jet turbofan engine.
Second, U.S. antitrust enforcement against foreign enterprises is also
somewhat limited by the difficulties in obtaining evidence abroad. The Brit-
ish bill 3' is a reminder that foreign governments can and do block U.S.
enforcement efforts. In many merger and joint venture cases, the involve-
ment of one U.S. firm will be a sufficient avenue to challenge the transac-
tion; this is especially true since the Premerger Notification Law' 32 gives U.S.
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agencies the chance to investigate and obtain information concerning pro-
posed mergers and joint ventures. Further, the Justice Department now has
the power to issue Civil Investigative Demands to persons abroad. 1
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When a U.S. agency or court serves compulsory process on a foreign
party, and that party, acting in good faith, is prohibited by local law from
complying with it, one nation's interests must give way. U.S. courts have so far
held that the relative interests must be weighed and that, where the foreign
national interest is strong, and the consequences for the private party under
the foreign law for compliance are severe, they will often not require compli-
ance.33 This problem further differentiates the application of U.S. antitrust
laws between U.S. and foreign firms operating in transnational commerce.
Finally, there is sometimes a problem in formulating an appropriate
remedy in international merger cases. If a U.S. firm proposes to merge with a
foreign firm or enter into a joint venture with it, this can be easily enjoined.
However, if two foreign firms with no U.S. affiliates combine, there may be
no practical way to attack the transaction, even if one or both parties have
substantial sales in the United States. Suppose, on the other hand, that both
these foreign firms have U.S. subsidiaries that have a relatively small share
of the U.S. market that is, however, subject to scrutiny under the Justice
Department's Merger Guidelines. Should the United States and other coun-
tries in similar positions require divestiture of the U.S. subsidiaries? Again, a
weighing of the relative interests in the transaction may hold the only princi-
pled solution.
Because of all these factors-comity, jurisdiction, additional barriers to
entry, evidence, and remedies-U.S. antitrust laws concerning economic con-
centration affect domestic firms more than foreign firms. Whether this places
U.S. companies at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their foreign competitors here or
abroad is beyond the scope of this brief discussion. It should be remembered,
however, that U.S. companies are generally free to conduct joint operations in
foreign markets and to merge with foreign firms if in the process they do not
restrain or tend to suppress competition in the United States.
The clearer problem is that these factors substantially increase the un-
certainties of antitrust analysis, a problem aggravated by the fact that deci-
sion making is not centralized. Antitrust enforcement involves not only the
Department of Justice and the FTC, but also the courts and sometimes other
agencies. Moreover, private suits may be filed regardless of whether the
government takes any action. In both the uranium and shipping cases, mas-
sive treble damage actions are underway' 35 and, in the shipping case, the
Federal Maritime Commission is investigating whether the alleged arrange-
ments violated the Shipping Act of 1916. 136
It has been argued that antitrust enforcement in foreign commerce
should be treated as an element of U.S. foreign economic policy and should
be handled by diplomacy rather than by legal process.'37 This would work a
substantial modification, both procedural and substantive, of the antitrust
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laws as they apply to foreign commerce. It is, quite frankly, unlikely to occur.
However, it may be that, at a minimum, the federal government should take
a more active role in private litigation. In certain cases, it may be appropriate
for the government to provide its views to the courts on questions of jurisdic-
tion and comity through amicus curiae briefs. This could promote a more
consistent U.S. approach in an area of great concern to our allies and to the
United Staes. To date, the federal government has hesitated even to appear
to take sides in private suits; however, some cases may have such interna-
tional economic and political significance that they should become the legiti-
mate concern of the executive branch.
CONCLUSION
While we have tried to demonstrate that the lack of consensus within the
United States, and among other nations, on what is and is not the concentra-
tion problem is a fundamental impediment to the establishment of trans-
national standards or institutions for addressing it, there is still a basis for
present collaboration leading to possible future consensus. At the least, in-
creasing horizontal and aggregate concentration leads to new economic rela-
tionships and dependencies that may in some respects be both less efficient
and more harmful to important social and political values. Accordingly, these
phenomena should be better measured and understood.
The OECD report'38 may be a watershed document. If it is possible to
agree that obtaining a better understanding of the nature and impact of
industrial concentration is a shared problem for developed countries, then a
necessary basis for further international collaboration will be established.
Five developing stages of international collaboration are possible. The
first stage is expanding the collection and reporting of concentration data
within the various nation states. The OECD report recognizes this objective
as essential to further action. It suggests that:
(a) Concentration statistics should be expanded by, for example, calcu-
lating several different measures, and by introducing new size vari-
ables, studying enterprise and local concentration, defining indus-
tries more finely, taking into account foreign trade, and by studying
concentration outside the industrial sector;...
(c) studies should be undertaken into the relationships between the
structure of an industry and its behavior and performance; and
(d) where Member countries have not produced concentration studies,
they should either undertake such studies themselves or encourage
private research into the causes and effects of concentration .... 139
The second stage is sharing, comparing, and analyzing data across na-
tional boundaries. If the Japanese experience is relevant to U.S. law enforce-
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ment and vice versa, more uniform data and data gathering is necessary, as
are institutions to collect and disseminate this information, such as the
OECD, GATT, UNCTAD and the U.N. Centre on Transnational Corpora-
tions, as well as private research bodies. There is a clear and disconcerting
absence of relevant comparative data and important analytical studies of
industrial organization.14 Furthermore, only recently have U.S. antitrust en-
forcers (and even more recently, a handful of private U.S. antitrust lawyers)
agreed that something can be learned from foreign antitrust experience.
Foreign data should be utilized in more U.S. analysis and foreign legal devel-
opments should be referred to more frequently in developing U.S. enforce-
ment policy and common law jurisprudence.
The third stage is compiling information on and reflecting upon indus-
trial concentration in international markets. Progress in the first two devel-
opmental stages will facilitate this process. Such action may assist U.S.
antitrust authorities in determining appropriate enforcement policy as to
concentration in the U.S. submarkets of larger world markets, such as the
automobile industry. The OECD Steel Committee, acting independently of
the work of the Restrictive Business Practices Committee, is accumulating
and analyzing such aggregate data to assist member states in coping with
the international economic difficulties of that industry. "4' The International
Energy Agency is performing a similar task as to the world oil industry.1
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Further progress at this stage requires greater willingness to share data
across national boundaries and to accommodate the conflicting goals of
promoting knowledge and progress on the one hand, while providing some
protection to national security and private proprietary interests on the other.
The fourth stage is greater cooperation between nation states in facilitat-
ing the investigations and prosecutions of national enforcement agencies
against transnational enterprises acting outside that nation's territory with a
significant adverse impact within its territory. It is becoming increasingly
clear that extraterritorial law enforcement is an inevitable and increasing fact
of life in an interdependent world. Absent any extraterritorial enforcement,
transnational enterprises possess the theoretical ability to at least partially
evade the enforcement of laws of a nation affected by their conduct.
The main problem with extraterritorial antitrust enforcement is not so
much that it is extraterritorial, but that it involves direct conflicts between
sovereign jurisdictions over fundamental policies. If greater consensus does
develop that there is a phenomenon of excessive concentration, it may be
desirable for one nation to defer to the law enforcement efforts of another in
particular instances for the purposes of gathering information across bounda-
ries or asserting jurisdiction over one's nationals. This type of cooperation is
increasing not only with respect to organized crime and drug smuggling, but
also with respect to unfair trade practices as defined in the GATT codes. 1
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While cooperation on international cartel activity would be expected to come
sooner, this stage becomes plausible when the other three have been well
established.
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Finally, progress to that extent would make it possible to consider a joint
enforcement effort by teams of enforcers from two or more national antitrust
agencies, or even by employees of an international antitrust agency dealing
with excessive concentration by transnational enterprises in several national
markets. For those who consider this a utopian vision, consider what the
Competition Directorate of the EEC has accomplished in just fifteen years. It
has fleshed out a multilateral treaty into an organic body of developing case
law-with strong common standards and multinational enforcement experi-
ence. 144 Twenty-five years ago, few scholars would have expected such
progress for a joint antitrust agency working to promote competition among
such a diversity of European states, inter alia, by increasing collaboration
with national antitrust agencies.
The work of a distinguished political scientist, Inis Claude, suggests that
this proposed agenda follows a fifty-year-old theory in international relations
called functionalism.4 Most fully developed by David Mitrany,146 its corner-
stone is the proposition that "a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of
political conflicts" is the development of ad hoc institutions of economic and
social cooperation.147 The Mitrany thesis should be acceptable to antitrust
authorities who are skeptical about comprehensive planning for social and
economic organizations. It is not yet possible to define clearly and commonly
the concentration problem, let alone fashion a viable remedy for it; however,
government officials can at least commit themselves to learn and share.
This volume may be an important early step on the road to cooperatively
solving the problem, for it provides a basis in Mitrany's words for ".... bind-
ing together those interests which are common, where they are common and
to the extent to which they are common. '"148
NOTES
1. OECD, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE




2. Id. at 130-38.
3. Id. at 138, citing KWOKA, JR.,





4. Id. at 138.
5. OECD Document DAF/RBP/3798
transmitted to Experts of the Re-
strictive Business Practices Com-
mittee on October 16, 1979. A copy
is reprinted infra, Annex 1.
6. See Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy
Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, "Remarks on
Where the Justice Department Is
Heading and Why: Some Thoughts
on Proposals for Conglomerate
Merger Legislation," Conference,
New York City (June 22,
1979).
7. See, e.g., KAISER ALUMINUM &




Doctrines and Problems of U.S. Control • 31
8. Much of the current debate about
the problem of conglomerate
mergers centers on two pieces of
legislation introduced by Senator
Kennedy. See Boies, International
Implications of Limitations on Ag-
gregate Concentration, post. One is
S. 600, the Small and Independent
Business Protection Act of 1979,
introduced March 8, 1979, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. The other is S.
1246, the Energy Antimonopoly Act
of 1979, introduced May 24, 1979,
96th Cong., 1st Sess.
9. See, e.g., L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST
657-67 (1977).
10. J. Rahl, "International Cartels and
Their Regulation," Columbia Uni-
versity Center for Law and Eco-
nomic Studies, Conference on In-
ternational Regulation of Restrictive
Business Practices. (November 9,
1979) (Unpublished).
11. Testimony on Foreign Investment in
the United States: Hearings on S.
1284 Before the Subcomm. on Inter-
national Trade, Investment and Mon-
etary Policy of the Senate Comm. On
Banking, Currency and Housing.
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-17 (1975)
(statement of Thomas E. Kauper).
12. See text accompanying notes 114-
40, infra.
13. See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, COUNCIL ON WAGE AND
PRICE STABILITY, A STUDY OF
STEEL PRICES, Ch. 2 (1975); FTC,
BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, STAFF
REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES
STEEL INDUSTRY AND ITS
INTERNATIONAL RIVALS, Ch. 2, II
and Ch. 4, 1 (1977); United States
v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495, 534 (1948) (Douglas, J. dis-
senting); United States v. Bethle-
hem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
14. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1976).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
18. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563 (1966).
19. Elzinga, The Antimerger Law: Pyr-
rhic Victories, 12 J. L. & ECON. 43
(1969).
20. See ANTITRUST DIVISION
WORKLOAD REPORT, submitted to
the staff of the Senate Subcomm.
on Antitrust Monopoly and Busi-
ness Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (De-
cember 7, 1979) (unavailable at
date of printing).
21. MERGER GUIDELINES OF THE DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, 1 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 4510 (1968).
22. Id. at 6881.
23. Id. at 6884.
24. Id.
25. FTC, HART-SCOTT-RODINO
ANTITRUST IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF
1976-PREMERGER NOTIFICATION;
REPORTING AND WAITING PERIOD
REQUIREMENTS; 43 Fed. Reg.
33450 (1978).
26. This information is based on un-
published records retained by the
Antitrust Division. During this
eighteen-month period approxi-
mately 1,340 premerger notifica-
tions were received by the Antitrust
Division as a whole.
27. Adams, The "Economic" Analysis of
Transnational Mergers, post.
28. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
21, at 6884.
29. United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Ill.
1972), af1fd, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
30. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
31. Id. at 777.
32. Testimony Concerning the Failing
Company Defense before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust, Monopoly, and
Business Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (statement
32 - United States Perspectives
of John H. Shenefield) (available
from the Legal Procedure Unit of
the Antitrust Division).
33. 415 U.S. at 506.
34. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note
21, at 6887-88.
35. United States v. Marine Bancorpo-
ration, 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
36. BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24
(2d Cir. 1977).
37. 418 U.S. at 633 (1974).
38. Adams, supra note 27.
39. 557 F.2d at 25.
40. Id. at 29.
41. See J. Griffin, Antitrust Con-
straints on Acquisitions by Aliens
in the United States, 13 INT'L
LAW. 427 (1980).
42. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,623
at 21,773.
43. Id. at 21,779.
44. Id. at 21,782.
45. Id. at 21,779.
46. Id. at 21,778.
47. Id. at 21,782.
48. Id. at 21,779.
49. Id. at 21,783.
50. Id. at 21,784.
51. Id. at 21,784-85.
52. Id. at 21,783.
53. United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-33
(1973).
54. In the Matter of Brunswick, 3
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,623
at 21,785.
55. See text accompanying notes 129-
30, infra, for a discussion of the
proposed joint venture between
Rolls Royce and Pratt & Whitney in
the manufacture of two types of jet
engines.
56. 471 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
57. Id. at 537-38.
58. Id. at 539.
59. Brief for the Appellant, United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
No. 79-4109 (9th Cir., filed July
13, 1979).
60. 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978).
61. Brief for the Appellant, supra note
59, at 26-31.
62. Id. at 32-33.
63. Id. at 33 n.78.
64. ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, GUIDE FOR INT'L
OPERATIONS (1977).
65. See especially, M. BLECHMAN,
FOREIGN LICENSING MONOGRAPH,
27 et seq. (1977) (unpublished
draft submitted to the Monograph
Committee of the Antitrust Section
of the American Bar Association).
66. GUIDE FOR INT'L OPERATIONS, SU-
pra note 64, at 31.
67. See, e.g., Turner, Teritorial Restric-
tions in the International Transfer
of Technology, TOKYO CONFERENCE
ON INT'L ECON. AND COMPETITION
POL'Y 151, 156 (1973).
68. See Adams, supra note 27.
69. Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1, 78 (1911).
70. The Commission was organized in
1978 and directed by the president
to study and make recommenda-
tions on ways to improve the con-
duct of large antitrust cases, in-
cluding ways to improve relief in
such cases.
71. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL 114, 119 (January 22,
1979) (COMMISSION REPORT). This
preference for structural relief may
be fundamental in U.S. antitrust
law and theory, but it is not re-
flected in competition laws of other
countries. Most of these statutes at-
tempt to control the behavior of
dominant firms; for the most part,
they do not include provisions for
directly attacking the power that
has been abused.
See, e.g., the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, No.
Doctrines and Problems of U.S. Control - 33
4300, U.N.T.S. Article 86, which
proscribes abuses by one or more
dominant undertakings within the
Common Market or in a substantial
part of it; Federal Republic of
Germany's Act Against Restraints
of Competition, Sections 22(1) and
22(2), discussed in Edwards,
American and German Policy To-
ward Conduct by Powerful Enter-
prises: A Comparison, 23
ANTITRUST BULL. 83 (1978), which
prohibits abusive conduct by domi-
nant enterprises. Similar statutes
can be found in the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and
Canada.
The antimonopoly law of Japan is
a notable exception, in that it does
provide for dissolution of monopo-
lists, but only as a last resort if no
other remedy would be sufficient,
and not as the first remedy to be
thought of in cases involving mar-
ket power. ANTIMONOPOLY LAW OF
JAPAN OF 1977 § 8-4 (Counselor's
Office of Fair Trade Commission,
ed.) (1977).
72. See, e.g., the decision entered in
United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968)
in which the Supreme Court
granted the government's motion to
add a divestiture provision to a de-
cree entered ten years earlier. Dis-
cussed in COMMISSION REPORT, su-
pra note 71, at 117-19.
73. ANTIMONOPOLY LAW OF JAPAN
(1977), supra note 71, at § 8-4(1).
74. Boies, supra note 8.
75. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
71, at 156.
76. United States v. Aluminum Com-
pany of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
77. United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass 1953), affd per curiam 347
U.S. 521 (1964).
78. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
71, at 158-59.
79. These commissioners believe that a
"no conduct" standard might dis-
courage firms with a near-mono-
poly position from undertaking le-
gitimate competitive actions, and
that the emphasis on proving effi-
ciencies as a defense to structural
relief would only protract litigation.
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
71, at 161-62.
80. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
71, at 156.
81. California Computer Products v. In-
ternational Businesn Machine
Corp., 1979-1 TRADE CASES (CCH)
62,713 (9th Cir. 1979).






603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 287.
Id.
87. California Computer Products, Inc.,
1979-1 TRADE CASES at 77,983.
88. 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied., 429 U.S. 1122
(1977).
89. Empire Gas threatened to put a
competitor out of business if he re-
fused to raise his prices, followed
through with price cuts; refused to
mail a distributor invoices so he
could pay his bills, then on this
pretense, refused to sell him the
propane he needed. It also went
door-to-door soliciting a competi-
tor's customers by saying the com-
petitor had gone out of business,
even though the competitor had
not. Although the court agreed that
this conduct was anticompetitive, it
concluded that there was no rea-
sonable probability that Empire Gas
would ever get much more than its
existing 50 percent market share,
primarily because of easy entry in
the liquid petroleum gas retail
business.
34 - United States Perspectives
90. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
75, at 150-51.
91. See, e.g., Sulmeyer v. Coca Cola Co.,
515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); George
R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004
(1975); Dearney & Trecker Corp. v.
Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d
579, 579 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied
405 U.S. 1066 (1972); Lessig v.
Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459 (9th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964).
92. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note
71, at 165-66. The word risk of
monopolization rather than prob-
ability was used in order to avoid
the implication that the term refers
to a greater than 50 percent chance
that monopoly will occur. Id. at
151.
93. Id. at 149-50.
94. In re E.I. duPont de Nemours &
Company, No. 9108, FTC (filed
Sept. 4, 1979), 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 21,613.
95. DuPont's records indicated it
planned to extend its market share
from 42 percent in 1977 to 53 per-
cent in 1985.
96. DuPont, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,613 at 21,750.
97. See Ky P. Ewing, Jr., Deputy As-
sistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, "Remarks on Shared
Monopoly and Concentration,"
Conference, New York City (De-
cember 1, 1978) (available from
the Legal Procedure Unit of the
Antitrust Division).
98. Id. See, e.g., Weiss, "The Structure-
Conduct-Performance Paradigm
and Antitrust," presentation at the
Conference on Antitrust Law and
Economics, University of Pennsyl-
vania, November 17, 1978; Quails,
Stability and Persistence of Eco-
nomic Profit Margins in Highly
Concentrated Industries, 40 S.
EcoN. J. 604 (1974); SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 184
n.3 (lst ed. 1971).
99. Hart, A Forecast of Antitrust Policy
Regarding Economic Concentra-
tion, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 51
(1965); Hart, Restructuring the
Oligopoly Sector: The Case for a
New "Industrial Reorganization
Act," 5 ANTITRUST L & ECON. REV.
35 (1975) (Pt. 1); 6 ANTITRUST L.
& ECON. REV. 47 (1972) (Pt 2).
100. Winn & Leabo, Rates of Return,
Concentration and Growth--Ques-
tion of Disequilibrium, 17 J. L. &
ECON. 97 (1974); Mancke, Causes
of Interfirm Profitability Differ-
ences: A New Interpretation of the
Evidence, 88 Q. J. ECON. 191
(1974); Weston, Pricing Behavior
of Large Firms, 10 W. ECON. J. 1
(1972).
101. Handler, Some Unresolved Problems
of Antitrust, 62 COLUM. L. REV.
930 (1962).
102. One purpose is to provide some in-
formation on concentration in the
United States. Secondly, of course,
the Division is interested in prose-
cutable cases. The intital survey be-
gan with a universe of 717 manu-
facturing industries in the United
States selected on the basis of a
four-digit Standard Industrial Clas-
sification, which possessed one or
more five-digit product categories,
and with a four-firm concentration
ration of 40 percent or more in
1972. Roughly one-half were ex-
cluded, either because they were
not known to be shared monopo-
lies, or because their SIC code did
not constitute a product market in
any reasonable antitrust sense. A
year ago, the division announced
that from these, approximately sev-
Doctrines and Problems of U.S. Control • 35
enty product lines had been pegged
for immediate inquiry; the re-
mainder will be examined over
time. Ewing, supra note 97, at 6-8.
103. Id. at 9.
104. Id. at 11.
105. United States v. General Electric
Co., [1977-21 TRADE CASES (CCH)
% 61,659-60.
106. Supra note 71; See Schroder, Le
Concept de Position Dominante
dans l'Application des Articles 66
paragraphe 7 du Traite CECA et 86
Traite CEE, in LA
REGLEMENTATION DU
COMPORTEMENT DES MONOPOLES
ET ENTERPRISES DOMINANTES EN
DROIT COMMUNANTAIRE, (J.A. Van
Damme ed. 1977) 186; Temple
Lang, Regulating Multinational
Corporate Concentration: The Eu-
ropean Economic Community, post.
107. Competition Act C-13, 30th Parlia-
ment, 3d Sess., § 29 (1977). See
Gressman, Canadian Merger Policy
and Its International Implications,
post.
108. Laws Concerning the Prohibition of
Private Monopolization and the
Preservation of Fair Trade, as
amended, ANTIMONOPOLY LAW OF
JAPAN, Ch. 1 § 2 (7) (1977).
109. Japan Times, Nov. 30, 1977.
110. A related issue is whether the use
of a shared monopoly theory may
bring about changes in "attempt to
monopolize" law: Could certain
conduct of a single firm be held an
attempt to create a shared mono-
poly situation?
111. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
112. The application of the Act to for-
eign persons raises a number of
issues. For example, will the full
penalty of S10,000 a day be im-
posed against a foreign person for
each day of noncompliance? 15
U.S.C. § 18a(g) (1). Will there be
secrecy problems: Where domestic
companies alone are involved, there
are confidentiality requirements. 15
U.S.C. § 18a(h). But where a for-
eign company is involved, will the
intital inquiry be an "antitrust ac-
tion" that requires notification to
foreign governments under existing
OECD notification and consultation
commitments? Will there be an op-
portunity for consultation about the
economic implications of pending
mergers or acquisitions? This is not
built into the statutory timetable for
review.
113. United States purchasers of foreign
assets or voting securities are ex-
empt from reporting unless $10
million or more sales in or into the
United States can be attributed to
the acquired person in the most re-
cent fiscal year. If a foreign issuer
is acquired, the acquisition must be
reported if, together with all the en-
tities it controls, the foreign issuer
holds assets located in the United
States having an aggregate book
value of $10 million or more, or
made sales in or into the United
States of S10 million or more in its
most recent fiscal year. Certain in-
vestment assets and securities of
another person are excluded from
this computation.
Similarly, acquisitions by a for-
eign person must be reported if it
acquires assets in the United States
of $10 million or more (excluding
investment assets). Certain acquisi-
tions by a foreign person outside
the United States must be reported
as well if it acquires voting securi-
ties of a foreign issuer which will
give the acquiring foreign person
either control of an issuer that
holds assets in the United States of
$10 million or more, or control of a
U.S. issuer with annual net sales or
total assets of $10 million or more.
In addition, the acquisition must be
36- United States Perspectives
reported if the aggregate annual
sales of the foreign acquirer and
the foreign acquired person in or
into the United States total $110
million or more, or if their aggre-
gate total assets located in the
United States total $110 million or
more. Supra note 25.
114. United States v. Atlantic Container
Line, Crim. No. 79-271, 79-272
(indictment filed June 1, 1979,
D.D.C.).
115. As noted at p.17, weakening the vi-
tality of the potential competitor
doctrine can have the same effect.
116. [19791 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) F-1.
117. See, e.g., Business Records Protec-
tion Act of 1947, ONT. REV. STAT.
c. 54 (1970); Netherlands Eco-
nomic Competition Act of June 28,
1957 as amended by Act of July 16,
1958, Art. 39.
118. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of
Certain Evidence) Act of 1976,
Austl. Acts. No. 121 (1976).
119. Extraterritoriality in Canada-
United States Relations, 63 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 425 (1970).
120. An example of this is the British
export embargo to Rhodesia, see
Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, c.
76; Director of Public Prosecutions
v. Doot, 119731 1 All E.R. 940
(H.L.).
121. See generally General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, October 30,
1947, 61 Stat. (5) (6), T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (effective
Jan. 1, 1948) as amended T.I.A.S.
No. 1890; Agreements Reached in
the Tokyo Round of the Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiation: Documents
to the United States House of Rep-
resentatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
257-307, 309-37 (1979) (message
from the president).
122. OECD Council Recommendation
Document No. C(79)154 (1979).
For a full text of this recommenda-
tion, see Stockmann, "Reflections
on Recent OECD Activities: Regu-
lation of Multinational Corporate
Conduct and Structure," post. See
also, Agreement Between the Gov-
ernment of the United States of
America and the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany Relat-
ing to Mutual Cooperation Regard-
ing Restrictive Business Practices,
signed June 23, 1976, entered into
force September 11, 1976, 119761
27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291.
123. United States v. Gulf Oil Corp., No.
78-123 (W.D.Pa.) (Crim. informa-
tion filed May 9, 1978).
124. The principle of comity is one of
deference to the interests of foreign
sovereign authorities where the ap-
plication of one's own national law
could work a disproportionate harm
to those foreign interests. The prin-
ciple is analogous to the 'weighing
of interests" test for resolving con-
flicts of law between the states of
our federal system. See, e.g., Tim-
berlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287
(3d Cir. 1979); A. VON MEHREN
D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF
MULTINATIONAL PROBLEMS 80
(1963). It is most clearly enun-
ciated as to international conflicts
between nation states in Restate-
ment (2d) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States.
RESTATEMENT (2d) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 18, 39, 40 (1965). The
Restatement provides that, among
other factors to be taken into ac-
count are:
(b) the extent and the nature of
the hardship that inconsistent en-
forcement actions would impose ....
(c) the extent to which the re-
Doctrines and Problems of U.S. Control - 37
quired conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person,
and
(e) the extent to which the enforce-
ment of either state can reasonably
be expected to achieve compliance
of the rule prescribed by that state.
Id. at §40.
125. Testimony Regarding Department
of Justice Uranium Investigation
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Monopoly and Business Rights of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (State-
ment of John H. Shenefield) (una-
vailable at date of printing).
126. 15 U.S.C. §18 (1976).
127. 557 F.2d 24; See text accompany-
ing notes 39-41.
128. It is not known whether the diffi-
culty rose to the level of a possible
"failing company defense". See text
accompanying notes 28-33, supra.
129. Letter from then Assistant Attorney
General Thomas E. Kauper to at-
torneys Phil E. Gilbert, Jr. and Tho-
mas A. Dieterich, December 15,
1975, regarding two proposed joint
ventures between Rolls Royce
(1971) and United Technologies
Corp.
130. See, e.g., Imperial Chemical Indus-
tries, Ltd. v. E.C. Commission,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8161.
131. Supra note 116.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976).
133. Antitrust Procedures Improvement
Act, Pub. L. 96-90 Stat. 1383,
§ 102 amending §3 of the Antitrust
Civil Process Act (15 USC 1312)
134. See Societe Internationale v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); In re
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Ura-
nium Contracts Litigation, Ancillary
Proceedings, 563 F.2d 992 (10th
Cir. 1977).
135. See, e.g., Uranium Trust Litigation,
MDL 342 (Westinghouse Electric
Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., No.
76-C-3830) (N.D.Ill.); In re Ocean
Shipping Antitrust Litigation, MDL
395 (S.D.N.Y. M-21-26-CES, [all
cases]).
136. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976); Order of
Investigation August 14, 1979, Fed-
eral Maritime Commission Doc. No.
79-83.
137. See, e.g., Mann, Anglo-American
Conflict of International Jurisdic-
tion, 13 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 1460
(1964).
138. Supra note 1.
139. Id. at 144.
140. As the OECD report recommends,
id. at 144, "concentration data
should be made more uniform for
the purposes of international com-
parison, since experience in other
countries can be helpful in the de-
velopment of [national] competition
policy."
141. 14 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc.
1915 (Nov. 1, 1978).
142. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY,
OIL MARKET INFORMATION SYSTEM
(1979).
143. Multilateral Trade Agreements, su-
pra note 121.
144. See, Temple Lang, supra note 106.
145. 1. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO
PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEM AND
PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION 344-68 (3d ed.
1964).
146. D. MITRANY, THE PROGRESS OF
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT
(1933).
147. Supra note 148, at 345.
148. D. MITRANY, A WORKING PEACE
SYSTEM 40 (1946).
38 - United States Perspectives
ANNEX 1: REMARKS ON THE OECD CONCENTRATION REPORT
Remarks on the OECD report "Concentration and Competition Policy", by
Mr. D. G. Gill, member of the group of Experts on Restrictive Business
Practices of the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD,
made to the members of the Bureau of the OECD Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices at a meeting held on June 27, 1979. See Sum-
mary Record of the 36th meeting of the Committee, OECD Doc. No. RBP/
M(79)1 at item XI.
OECD Report on Concentration and Competition Policy
I recently received the draft of chapter 4 dated 19 April. I have not had an
opportunity to read the other sections of the OECD's study on concentration
and competition policy and will confine most of my comments to those por-
tions of the report dealing with the U.S.
I should note initially that, while the chapter contains a number of
comments with which I disagree, overall I found much in the report with
which I would agree. Paras. 4 and 5 discuss the many technical problems
involved in measuring concentration, and I certainly agree with and endorse
the description of the many great difficulities involved in this exercise. The
problem, at least in the U.S., is that the data derives from different bases, is
non-comparable over time, and includes non-comparable numerators and
denominators. Usually, the data is contaminated: for example, foreign opera-
tions may or may not be included in numerators or denominators, and much
non-manufacturing data is always included for manufacturing companies.
The definitions of industries are extremely artificial. Many of my criticisms of
the report stem from precisely these inadequacies. I note the following:
(1) Para. 11 observes that in the U.S. from 1958 to 1972 "concentration
tended to remain stable in already highly concentrated industries but in-
creased in the low to medium concentrated industries in a sample of 183
comparable manufacturing industries for which data were available". Many
economists and university professors in the U.S. question whether any such
trend is really observable. Betty Bock, Yale Brozen, Harold Demsets and Fred
Weston are representative of the many economists in the U.S. who challenge
the interpretations of concentration figures issued by the U.S. Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
(2) Para. 15 states that overall concentration in the U.S. in manufactur-
ing increased significantly in the post-war period from 1947 to 1952. The
report goes on to say that "most of this increase appears to have occurred in
the early part of the period". In fact, when one looks at the data, the latter
sentence is a clear understatement. The data (and I here refer to The Confer-
ence Board's 1978 study, p. 3, of The Relativity of Concentration Observa-
tions) show that the hundred largest U.S. firms grew not at all in their share
of total value added by manufacturing during the period from 1963 to 1972.
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The OECD report goes on to say that the percentage of total manufacturing
assets held by the Fortune 500 largest industrial corporations rose from 73 to
83% from 1972 to 1977. In fact, the official statistics of the U.S., contained in
the 1978 Statistical Abstract, at p. 576, show that the share of the 200 largest
firms (no data is furnished for the 500 largest corporations) declined from
60% in 1972 to 58.4% in 1977. As my economist friends say, it is very
difficult to observe much of a trend here.
(3) Para. 29 of the OECD report says that in the U.S. a considerable
amount of research confirms Bain's finding of a positive correlation between
concentration and profitability. I am sure that you are all aware that a consid-
erable amount of research does not confirm Bain's "finding"; indeed, more
recent and complete economic studies flatly reject it. I will here cite only
Messrs. Brozen, Singer, Stigler and McGee. These and other academics have
severely criticized the smallness and the lack of comparability of Professor
Bain's sample. Indeed, when one examines the definition of "price-cost mar-
gin", one finds that it includes all sorts of things: taxes, overhead, deprecia-
tion, distribution expense, research and development, everything other than
costs of materials and payrolls. Again, concentration statistics tend to be
extremely artificial in both their components and interpretations.
(4) Para. 31 says that it is "apparent" that high concentration is increas-
ing in the recent past. Most of the economists whom I have quoted would
reject any such simplistic conclusion for the U.S. I call your attention to an
interesting article on Aggregate Concentration, published last month by
Betty Bock, Jack Farkas, Deborah Weinberger of The Conference Board. The
Conference Board makes the obvious points about the inadequacies of the
statistics, the non-comparability of numerators and denominators and the
artificiality of the industry classifications. They also point out that the identity
of the 50 or 100 or 200 largest manufacturing corporations changes from
year to year. For example, between 1947 and 1977, 21 of the 50 largest in
assets in 1947 had been replaced by other corporations by 1977. Eighty-five
of the 200 largest in sales had been replaced by 1977. The pattern is similar
for sales and assets for whatever group you chose to examine. Is it reasonable
then to talk about the common characteristics of the 50, 100 or 200 largest
corporations over a period of time when the identity of the group is chang-
ing? The Conference Board concludes by suggesting that "far from witness-
ing signals of agglomeration of corporate power in fewer and fewer hands-
we are seeing data showing an apparent explosion above the standard cut-
offs. And we are witnessing this proliferation without significant support
from conglomeration or large-scale acquisition. Are we, then, viewing num-
bers that show increasing power in a few hands-or signals of a dispersion of
size at the top?
(5) Para. 43 states that studies in the U.S. "have concluded" that
mergers account for a varying but significant proportion of increases in con-
centration. In fact, for the 200 largest corporations the annualized ratio of
acquisitions as a percentage of change in assets varied from .60 of 1% in
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1947-54 to 1.04% in the 1972-1977 period. The figures for all manufactur-
ing corporations were somewhat lower but roughly equivalent in all periods.
Para. 43 goes on to observe that conglomerate mergers have been increas-
ingly in evidence as a percentage of merger activity in the U.S., a far from
surprising phenomenon when one considers the enthusiastic and effective
enforcement of the U.S. antimerger statute against horizontal and vertical
acquisitions. Finally, the report goes on to suggest that the profits of the
leading firms in concentrated industries tend to be higher than required to
attract capital. The generality of this last observation almost defies analysis
and, insofar as it is based upon price-cost margin figures, is virtually without
meaning. As Betty Bock has observed, "until we have profit and concentra-
tion data that match, mechanical mating of the two types of information can
produce only hybrid conclusions."
(6) In conclusion, let me make three points:
(a) The report observes that "in the absence of conclusive evi-
dence on concentration and its effect", we should all take note
of the politically important point concerning the danger of cen-
tralization of power in the hands of a few enterprises. Fair
enough-but perhaps equally relevant is the danger of the
centralization of economic power in the hands of government
and government ministries who regulate economic enterprises
on the basis of hopelessly inexact economic data or interpreta-
tions thereof. Misleading or poorly interpreted data can provide
a convenient excuse to those regulators who wish to substitute
their personal social or political judgments in place of the eco-
nomic judgment of the market.
(b) One is also struck, in reading the report, at the lack of refer-
ence to international economic competition. Para. 3 mentions
the relevance of such competition but then focuses on the
various domestic markets which obviously have higher con-
centration ratios. In the U.S. context, for example, discussion
of domestic automobile industry concentration ratios without
reference to increasing international competition makes no
economic sense at all.
(c) In remarks last year at an antitrust seminar, Ms. Betty Bock
cited an illustration to demonstrate her contention that eco-
nomic theories based solely on structure and so-called objec-
tive economic statistics can be extremely dangerous. Some
years ago the U.S. antitrust authorities, noting that the two top
U.S. tire companies accounted for a high percentage of all
tires manufactured in the U.S. and had previously lowered
their prices for premium tires to the disadvantage of small
competitors, brought a suit against the two companies, essen-
tially claiming that they were behaving in a monopolistic fash-
ion. After careful examination, the Antitrust Division, conced-
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ing that it had failed to consider a number of very important
factors in bringing suit, asked for the dismissal of the suit.
These factors included such facts as the shift of tire buyers
away from premium to regular brands and the presence in the
tire market of the huge automobile companies which were the
principal customers for tires. The presence of this countervail-
ing customer power effectively regulated the tire manufac-
turers. The point I am making is that statistics and concentra-
tion figures alone are no substitute for adequate economic
analyses.
